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Authorship, Disrupted:
AI Authors in Copyright and First
Amendment Law
Margot E. Kaminski*
Technology is often characterized as an outside force, with essential
qualities, acting on the law. But the law, through both doctrine and theory,
constructs the meaning of the technology it encounters. A particular
feature of a particular technology disrupts the law only because the law
has been structured in a way that makes that feature relevant. The law, in
other words, plays a significant role in shaping its own disruption. This
Essay is a study of how a particular technology, artificial intelligence, is
framed by both copyright law and the First Amendment. How the
algorithmic author is framed by these two areas illustrates the importance
of legal context and legal construction to the disruption story.
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Technology is often characterized as an outside force that operates
upon the law to disturb it.1 Napster breaks copyright law;2 3D printing
* Copyright © 2017 Margot E. Kaminski. Associate Professor of Law, Colorado
Law; Faculty Director, Silicon Flatirons. Thanks to Jack Balkin for the opportunity to
co-teach our Robotics seminar a few years ago, which gave rise to these ideas. Thanks
to Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Meg Leta Jones, Kate Klonick, Toni Massaro, Christina
Mulligan, and Nicholson Price for comments and feedback. All mistakes are my own.
1 See Meg Leta Jones, Does Technology Drive Law? The Dilemma of
Technological Exceptionalism in Cyberlaw 6 (June 8, 2017) (unpublished
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2981855 (“[U]ntil
recently the debate around technological exceptionalism has been not whether it
exists, but when it exists. When is a technology so new and so different that it will

589

590

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 51:589

breaks patent law;3 the internet challenges First Amendment and
communications law;4 Uber breaks employment law;5 the Internet of
Things upends Fourth Amendment law.6 In reality, the picture is far
more complex. The law can itself drive technological development;
technologists often design around legal entitlements.7 To the extent
new technology (or really, the social practice of a new technology8)
disrupts the law, it does so because of how it encounters existing
features of the law, both doctrinal and theoretical. The law, in
constructing — that is, building the meaning of — new technological
drive significant legal change? When is a technology so novel that the law, as
established, breaks and cannot account for it?”).
2 See, e.g., Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster
and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (2002) (describing
how Napster challenged and ultimately changed copyright law).
3 See, e.g., Deven R. Desai & Gerard N. Magliocca, Patents, Meet Napster: 3D
Printing and the Digitization of Things, 102 GEO. L.J. 1691, 1695-96 (2014) (arguing
that the ease of copying something through a 3D printer “kills” patents); Mark A.
Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 460, 462-63 (2014) (“Unless
they strictly control and limit the sale and manufacture of 3D printers and gene
printers, they may find themselves unable to prevent the production of unauthorized
designs.”).
4 See Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom
of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 6-10 (2004) (identifying
four features of the digital environment that challenge freedom of expression and
related areas of law: the low cost of copying; the fact that content goes across borders;
the low cost of building on (“glomming on”) to existing content; the lower costs of
distribution which democratize speech) [hereinafter Balkin, Digital Speech].
5 See, e.g., Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87, 97-98
(2016) (describing how Uber disrupts employment law — but also noting that this
disruption of categories has been occurring in non-Uber-related cases as well).
6 See generally Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the Fourth
Amendment of Effects, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 805 (2016) (discussing how the Internet of
Things disrupts Fourth Amendment law); Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of
Things: First Steps Toward Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93
TEX. L. REV. 85 (2014) (discussing how the Internet of Things disrupts law more
generally speaking).
7 See, e.g., Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014)
(describing how defendants built a device consisting of various small antennas in a
warehouse to allow unlicensed live streaming of television, in an attempt to give
control to individual system users to achieve a favorable copyright law decision).
8 Technology is not an object; it is the social use of an object. See, e.g., Jack M.
Balkin, The Path of Robotics Law, 6 CALIF. L. REV. 45, 48-49 (2015) (“[W]hat lawyers
call ‘technology’ is usually a shorthand for something far more complex . . . . (1) how
people interact with new inventions and (2) how people interact with other people
using those new inventions or presupposing those new inventions.”) [hereinafter
Balkin, Robotics Law]; see also Jones, supra note 1, at 8 (statement of Balabanian)
(“[T]echnology means not simply a collection of machines, but the relationships
among them, their uses, and their relationship between them and people.”).
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developments and their social uses, takes a central part in its own
disruption.9
Conceiving of technology as some outside force that acts upon the
law can lead to a technology-centric approach in which one tries to
identify what features of a particular technology are legally
disruptive.10 This kind of disruption narrative gets it wrong. A
particular feature of a particular technology disrupts the law only
because the law has been structured — doctrinally and theoretically —
in a way that makes that feature relevant.11 The disruptive effects (if
any) of a technology become manifest when they encounter, interface
with, and are given particular meaning within the law.
This Essay is a study of the way a particular technology, artificial
intelligence, encounters and is incorporated into two distinct scenes of
regulation:12 copyright and First Amendment law. Artificial
intelligence (“AI”) appears to pose challenges for both of these areas of
U.S. law, because both areas at first glance appear to center on human
speakers or authors. Can an artificially intelligent author or speaker
receive copyright protection? Can it (he, she?) be protected by the
First Amendment?
The algorithmic “author,” it turns out, gets framed differently by
these two different legal areas, with differently disruptive results. This
illustrates the importance of legal context in the disruption story —
9 Balkin, Robotics Law, supra note 8, at 50 (observing that the importance of
certain purportedly disruptive features of robots “arises from the way that a new
technology interacts with a social and legal world already in place,” what he calls the
“scene of regulation.”).
10 Jones, supra note 1, at 2 (“For Calo, and others . . . ’essential qualities’ of
technology ‘drive the law and policy conversations that attend them.’ The task for law
scholars . . . is then to identify those qualities . . . .”); see Ryan Calo, Robotics and the
Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513, 516 (2015) [hereinafter Calo, Lessons of
Cyberlaw]. As Calo explains, one “essential quality” of robots is that they are
physically embodied; a robot can be characterized as disrupting U.S. tort law because
unlike software that causes only virtual crashes, robots cause physical crashes in
physical spaces. Id. at 533-34 (“Robots . . . differ from computers and software
precisely in that they are organized to act upon the world”); see also M. Ryan Calo,
Open Robotics, 70 MD. L. REV. 571, 598-601 (2011).
11 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012); see also Balkin,
Robotics Law, supra note 8, at 50 (“The problem . . . is not simply a feature of essential
characteristics of a technology. Rather, it arises from the way that a new technology
interacts with a social and legal world already in place.”). As several scholars have
now observed, the fact that a robot can cause physical harm may break down our
scheme for addressing software liability, but only because the U.S. system has created
limitations on liability for information harms. See Jones, supra note 1, at 6.
12 Balkin, supra note 8, at 50 (calling the “social and legal world already in place”
the “scene of regulation”).
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and the relative unimportance of particular features of the technology
itself.
The law’s existing construction of authorship paves the way for
whether and how the law is or is not disrupted by AI authors. If U.S.
copyright law constructed authorship as requiring a spark of human
brilliance, or if U.S. free speech law constructed speech protection as
being primarily about protecting individual human autonomy, there
would be little space in either for protecting AI speakers. If, on the
other hand, either or both areas of the law focused more on the needs
of audience members than the rights of human speakers, then AI or
emergent authors could more easily be incorporated into those
systems of legal meaning. This shows that when it comes to assessing
the extent of legal disruption, the details of a particular legal landscape
and its underlying theories are often as important as the features of a
particular technology.13 The AI author does not disrupt law in a
vacuum, because the law constructs authorship differently in different
contexts.
Technology thus does not just act upon the law; it encounters and is
framed by it. Technology can make salient or foreground existing
features of the law.14 But this description is incomplete; technology is
not just a stable lens through which we see stable aspects of the law. It
takes on a particular meaning within the law depending on what one
thinks the law is or should be. The law constructs — makes meaning
of — technologies.15 And that process of construction lays the
groundwork for whether and how a particular technology creates
challenges for the legal system.
In a forthcoming longer work,16 I address the details and
consequences of this construction process, and what it means for
understanding, anticipating, and even designing law for legal
disruption. In that work, I also take on the project of identifying
13 See id. (“Instead of saying that law is responding to essential features of new
technology, it might be better to say that social struggles over the use of new
technology are being inserted into existing features of law, disrupting expectations
about how to categorize situations.”).
14 See Balkin, Digital Speech, supra note 4, at 2 (“[D]igital technologies change the
social conditions in which people speak, and [thus] . . . bring to light features of
freedom of speech that have always existed in the background but now become
foregrounded.”).
15 See Jones, supra note 1, at 4 (“[C]yberlaw research should consider the ways in
which technologies, practices and social arrangements are constructed within certain
legal contexts: the legal construction of technology.”).
16 Margot E. Kaminski, Legal Disruption: How Technology Disrupts the Law
(2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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different kinds and different levels of disruption — when law is just
business as usual, versus when technology truly challenges it. In this
Essay, I focus on the process of legal construction: the importance of
understanding how the law makes meaning of technologies. I show
how one type of technology can be a lens through which we better see
the law.17 It can cause a move up from statutes or doctrine to
reassessing the theory behind them. But technology is very rarely so
disruptive that it causes the law to be unable to function. I join Meg
Jones in calling for a different analytical approach: we should identify
and analyze how the law constructs technology, rather than yielding
to a narrative that a technology is intrinsically disruptive.18 Law is, I
argue here, an important player in its own disruption.
I.

ALGORITHMIC AUTHORSHIP: THE CASE STUDY

Algorithmic or AI authorship seems poised to disrupt several areas
of law that at their core concern the human author. Roughly speaking,
algorithmic authorship is authorship by an algorithm — a computer
program, rather than a human. Artificial intelligence usually refers to a
more sophisticated and independent version of an algorithm; a closely
related term is “emergence,” which describes programs that produce
outputs their programmers and users could not predict.19 Examples of
algorithmic (though not necessarily emergent) authors include the
following: Google’s DeepDream has generated artwork;20 the What-If
Machine came up with the premises and characters for a (not very
good) West End musical;21 and the computer program Iamus
17 See Balkin, Digital Speech, supra note 4, at 2; see also Toni M. Massaro & Helen
Norton, Siri-ously? Free Speech Rights and Artificial Intelligence, 110 NW. L. Rev. 1169,
1171 (2016).
18 Jones, supra note 1, at 4.
19 Calo, Lessons of Cyberlaw, supra note 10, at 532, 538 (“[S]ystems that do more
than merely repeat instructions but adapt to circumstance.”); id. at 539-40 (reviewing
a deeper discussion of emergence versus autonomy and the famous Turing test).
20 Robert Hart, If an AI Creates a Work of Art, Who Owns the Rights to It?, QUARTZ
(Aug. 15, 2017), https://qz.com/1054039/google-deepdream-art-if-an-ai-creates-a-workof-art-who-owns-the-rights-to-it; Matt McFarland, Google’s Psychedelic “Paint Brush”
Raises the Oldest Question in Art, WASH. POST (Mar. 10, 2016), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/2016/03/10/googles-psychedelic-paint-brushraises-the-oldest-question-in-art.
21 See Mark Brown, World’s First Computer-Generated Musical to Debut in London,
GUARDIAN (Dec. 1, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/stage/2015/dec/01/beyondthe-fence-computer-generated-musical-greenham-common; Lyn Gardner, Beyond the
Fence Review — Computer-Created Show Is Sweetly Bland, GUARDIAN (Feb. 28, 2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/stage/2016/feb/28/beyond-the-fence-review-computer-
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composed music performed in 2012 by the London Symphony
Orchestra.22 Are these machine-created outputs protected by copyright
law or protected as free speech? Should they be? These questions have
already spawned significant debate.23
In the abstract, algorithmic authorship fundamentally challenges the
notion of the romantic author or speaker: an individual human being
who produces creative output during moments of enlightened
creativity.24 The romantic author is profoundly human; her creativity
stems, in fact, from her humanity. Romanticizing creativity as some
essential aspect of human identity is harder to do when a machine can
produce the same creative works. Similarly, it is harder to romanticize
free expression as an essential output of human autonomy when
machines can spew out news, poems, and op-eds.25
Algorithmic authorship in reality constitutes a spectrum of
practices, many of which do not meaningfully challenge either
philosophical stances on authorship or the U.S. legal system.26 For
example, when Google’s DeepDream art was sold, the human artists
who used the program kept the money — that is, they were for all

created-musical-arts-theatre-london (describing the resulting show Beyond the Fence
as “risibly stereotypical”); Stewart Pringle, Beyond the Fence: How Computers Spawned
a Musical, NEW SCIENTIST (Mar. 3, 2016), https://www.newscientist.com/article/
2079483-beyond-the-fence-how-computers-spawned-a-musical.
22 Philip Ball, Iamus, Classical Music’s Computer Composer, Live from Malaga,
GUARDIAN (July 1, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/music/2012/jul/01/iamuscomputer-composes-classical-music.
23 See, e.g., Bruce E. Boyden, Emergent Works, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 377, 379
(2016); James Grimmelmann, There’s No Such Thing as a Computer-Authored Work, 39
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 403, 407-08 (2016); see also Toni M. Massaro et al., Siri-ously 2.0:
What Artificial Intelligence Reveals About the First Amendment, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2481,
2483 (2017).
24 Annemarie Bridy, Coding Creativity: Copyright and the Artificially Intelligent
Author, STAN. TECH. L. REV., no. 5, 2012, at 4 (describing Roland Barthes’s and Michel
Foucault’s critiques of “the idea of the author as an individual creative personality, a
solitary originator of stylistically consistent works”); id. (referring to romantic
authorship as both “individualistic” and “proprietary”).
25 Did a Human or a Computer Write This?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/03/08/opinion/sunday/algorithm-humanquiz.html.
26 For a discussion of some of these difference practices, see Boyden, supra note
23, at 379 (“[T]he problem of computer-generated works is not a single problem, but
rather a set of related problems, some of which are easier than others to resolve.”); id.
at 380-81 (discussing a spectrum of examples, from “mad-lib” style algorithms where
machines fill in the blanks, to story-generating algorithms that are sometimes
indistinguishable from human-authored pieces); see also id. at 385-89.
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practical purposes considered to be the works’ authors.27 One artist
described the program as a “paintbrush”: a tool used to further a
human author’s vision.28 A creative algorithm can, at least in the right
circumstances, be characterized as a tool for authors rather than as an
independent creator.

My dog, Iggy/ My dog, Iggy, run through DeepDream’s DaVinci processor.
Credit Matthew R. Cushing (and DeepDream)(and maybe DaVinci)
The chair of digital arts at the Pratt Institute, however, suggested
that the algorithm’s human creators deserved credit, too.29 A second
approach to algorithmic authorship is thus to deem the human
authors of the algorithm as in some way co-authors of the resulting
work. For practical purposes in at least the near future, the central
question of algorithmic authorship will likely be a factual one:
whether the algorithm looks more like a tool, or whether the
algorithm’s programmers look more like co-authors.30

27

McFarland, supra note 20.
Id.
29 McFarland, supra note 20 (“Patchen thinks credit for Atken’s work should be
shared between the artist and the algorithm’s creators.”).
30 See Grimmelmann, supra note 23, at 407-08. See generally REGISTER OF
COPYRIGHTS, SIXTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS (1966),
http://www.copyright.gov/reports/annual/archive/ar-1965.pdf.
28

University of California, Davis

596

[Vol. 51:589

Finally, there is the more hypothetical question of what to do about
Strong AI: as-yet-nonexistent (and in all likelihood never existent)
artificial intelligence that operates independently of humans.31 What if
DeepDream were DeeperDreamer, and came up with output on its
own instead of serving as a stylistic tool for human artists? How does
the law handle machines that truly think? Or, leaving aside the
controversial requirement of consciousness, how does the law handle
works that are recognizably creative to a human audience, but are the
result of machine creation rather than deliberate human input?32 This
question of what to do about emergence — that is, machine output
that cannot be predicted by the humans involved — is the hardest
from a legal perspective. It may require a move up from analogizing
algorithms to existing doctrine and practices — using paintbrushes,
having co-authors — to analyzing why we have particular areas of law
in the first place, and the algorithms’ relationships to those larger
purposes.
II.

ALGORITHMIC AUTHORSHIP AND COPYRIGHT

Algorithmic authorship is treated differently in different subparts of
the legal system. This is because of differences in how those subparts
of the legal system operate and are theorized — and more specifically,
differences in how they theorize authorship.33 These differences show
that legal disruption does not stem from the technology alone, but
from the law it encounters. Technology that is greatly disruptive in
one legal area can be not-so-disruptive in another. The determinant of
the level of disruption is not just the technology by itself, but how it is
constructed by the law. Contemplating algorithmic authorship also
shows how law can be disrupted on different levels — doctrinal, or
31

See Massaro et al., supra note 23, at 2483.
See Boyden, supra note 23, at 390 (describing emergence); id. at 378, 384
(describing the problem as follows: “works that consist largely of creative elements
that have emerged unbidden from the operation of the program,” that is, a situation
where there are “at least two works at issue, one of which produces the other”); see
also Stuart M. Benjamin, Algorithms and Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1445, 1482 (2013)
(reviewing whether the First Amendment protects algorithmic speech).
33 As argued in this Essay, I believe the concept of authorship in these two areas of
law to be distinct. There has been a recent trend, however, towards proposing
unification. See Derek E. Bambauer, Copyright = Speech, 65 EMORY L.J. 199, 200-01
(2016) (proposing to unify the First Amendment and copyright law) [hereinafter
Bambauer, Copyright]; Christopher Buccafusco, A Theory of Copyright Authorship, 102
VA. L. REV. 1229, 1231 (2015) (arguing that for purposes of copyright law, “to be an
author of a writing, one must intend to produce a mental effect in an audience,” which
resembles the First Amendment’s Spence test, discussed further below).
32
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theoretical, requiring us to resort to theory to determine why subparts
of the legal system exist.34
For example, assessing copyright protection for algorithmically
authored works both illuminates features of existing U.S. law and
illustrates the law’s role in its own disruption. Although the Copyright
Office recently stated that works must be authored by a human to
receive copyright protection,35 that determination is likely not the end
of the question of how to treat machine speech.36
Algorithmic authorship could be handled under copyright law in
any number of ways.37 A software programmer could be deemed the
author and thus the owner of the program’s output. Or the user of the
computer could be the author; the programmer and user could be
joint authors; or, neither could be the author and the work could go
un-owned.38 Who gets to be called the work’s author, and who gets to
benefit from copyright’s incentives, is a matter less of technological
details of AI than of how we theorize authorship and ownership in the
U.S. copyright system.
At first glance, human authorship may seem central to copyright
law. The utilitarian purpose of copyright law is to incentivize
(presumably human) authors to create new works for the benefit of
net social welfare.39 A natural rights theory of copyright, less
emphasized in the United States, suggests that (human) authors

34 As Jack Balkin has noted, technological change can be a prism through which
we view the law and learn its underlying principles. Balkin, Digital Speech, supra note
4, at 4 (noting that the “digital revolution alters our perspective on freedom of speech
and leads to a series of disputes about what the free speech principle means”).
35 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES
§ 313.2 (3d ed. 2014), https://www.copyright.gov/comp3/docs/compendium-12-2214.pdf (“Similarly, the Office will not register works produced by a machine or mere
mechanical process that operates randomly or automatically without any creative
input or intervention from a human author.”).
36 Judicial deference to the Copyright Office’s decisions is controversial. See e.g.,
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct.
1002 (No. 15-866), WL 94219, at *33-36 (discussing the circuit split over deference
to the Copyright Office’s registration decisions).
37 See Boyden, supra note 23, at 383 (listing the various proposals for how to
handle emergent authorship).
38 Id. at 391 (stating that “as a theoretical matter, there is no good reason to assign
initial ownership rights over such works to anyone [because] no one needs to be
incentivized to produce the output of the program” and incentive to create the
program “is provided by the copyright in the program as a literary work”).
39 William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND
POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001), https://cyber.harvard.
edu/people/tfisher/iptheory.pdf.
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deserve rewards for the labor they put into their creations.40 A moral
rights, or personhood, theory of copyright suggests that (human)
authors imbue their creations with an aspect of their personality, so
that if the creation is stolen or harmed, an author’s personhood is
afflicted.41 Each of these theories arguably depends on the humanness
of an author.42
Beyond theory, authorship appears in the Constitution: Congress
may grant “Authors” copyright protection.43 The Copyright Act refers
to “works of authorship”44 that are owned by “the author or authors of
the work.”45 Human authorship thus might seem central to U.S.
copyright law.
Algorithmic authorship purportedly disrupts copyright law because
it removes, or greatly distances, the human author from the work.46 If
commentators are correct that much of U.S. copyright law rests on the
antiquated eighteenth century notion of the romantic author — a
human individual of lone genius inspired in a vacuum to create an
original work — then it is certainly hard to fit an algorithmic author
into that schema.47
But U.S. copyright law — through its various players and
interpreters, and at both theoretical and doctrinal levels — in fact
40 Lior Zemer, The Making of a New Copyright Lockean, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
892, 893-94 (2006).
41 See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957,
957 (1982) (exploring the connection between property rights and the personhood
perspective).
42 Boyden, supra note 23, at 391.
43 The Progress Clause permits Congress to allocate monopolies for limited times
to authors and inventors. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
44 17 C.F.R. § 102(a) (2017).
45 Id. § 201(a) (2017).
46 See, e.g., Boyden, supra note 23, at 380 (“Computer-generated works destabilize
copyright law’s approach to authorship by obscuring the connection between the
creative process and the work. Once that happens, it will no longer be possible to
simply assume that all minimally creative elements stemmed from the mind of one or
more human authors.”). But see Bridy, supra note 24, at 27 (“The increasing
sophistication of generative software and the reality that all creativity is algorithmic
compel recognition that AI-authored works are less heterogeneous to both their
human counterparts and existing copyright doctrine than appearances may at first
suggest.”); Grimmelmann, supra note 23, at 408 (arguing that even if there is distance
created it does not change ownership as the author is “is simply [making] the choice
to split the creative process into two stages rather than one”).
47 See THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND
LITERATURE 2-3 (Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds., 1994); Oren Bracha, The
Ideology of Authorship Revisited: Authors, Markets, and Liberal Values in Early American
Copyright, 118 YALE L. J. 186, 201 (2008).
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constructs authorship in a way that allows considerable room for nonhuman authorship. This starts with the underlying theory. The
dominant theory of why we have copyright in the United States,
utilitarianism, is more removed from the humanity of its author than,
say, moral rights or natural rights theory. Moral rights theory focuses
on a human’s personhood, natural rights on the fairness of rewarding
human labor mixed with commons material. By contrast, by focusing
on the net benefit creative works bring to society, utilitarianism
addresses not just a sole human author but also the vast human
audience that receives and benefits from both copyrighted works and
ownership exceptions.
Utilitarian theory makes the discussion of authorship a discussion
about incentives and net social welfare rather than humanness: do the
authors of algorithms need copyright as an incentive to produce
algorithms that in turn produce creative works?48 Do the algorithms
themselves?49 Utilitarianism suggests that works authored by an
algorithm might bring equal value to a human audience as works
authored by a human being.50 This theoretical framing makes it more
possible that an algorithmically authored work might receive
copyright protection in the United States than in countries that rely on
moral rights. It changes the nature of the conversation from being
about rewarding humans for creative endeavors to calibrating policy to
a level that benefits society as a whole, including the human audiences
of algorithmically authored works.
The theoretical room for copyright protection of algorithmically
authored works would have little impact if there were not also space
in the doctrine. U.S. copyright law as currently developed has two
doctrinal features that leave significant space for protecting
algorithmic authorship: a low originality threshold, and work-madefor-hire doctrine.
Copyrighted works must be original.51 Originality proves to be a
central doctrinal question of what authorship is, in copyright law.52
48 See Boyden, supra note 23, at 391 (suggesting ownership of copyright in the
underlying program itself is enough of an incentive).
49 Pamela Samuelson, Allocating Ownership Rights in Computer-Generated Works,
47 PITT. L. REV. 1185, 1199-200 (1986) (“Only those stuck in the doctrinal mud could
ever think that computers could be ‘authors.’”).
50 See Massaro et al., supra note 23, at 2487-88 (“[I]f and when they produce
information useful to natural persons who seek to participate in public discourse,
strong AI speakers should warrant similar protection.”).
51 See Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991) (“We
conclude that the names, towns, and telephone numbers copied by Feist were not
original to Rural and therefore were not protected by the copyright in Rural’s
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Whether authorship requires human genius, or human creativity, or
any human input at all, comes down to how judges interpret the
originality requirement.
In early decisions, some judges and justices touted the importance
of an individual and highly human creative spark, which would have
resulted in a higher originality threshold.53 But as Oren Bracha
observes, newly powerful economic actors — commercial publishers,
textbook and dictionary publishers, advertisers, and more — pushed
back against the doctrinal and legislative consequence of romantic
authorship.54 An advertiser seeking copyright protection in
advertisements would be ill-served by copyright doctrine that requires
a high degree of (human) originality.55 Similarly, the publisher of
commercial fiction would not want a judge to evaluate just how
original a new mass-market paperback potboiler is. These actors
argued largely successfully for judges to stay out of the process of
determining adequate levels of creativity.56 Their arguments coincided,
according to Bracha, with a philosophical shift towards evaluating the
market value of objects rather than their intrinsic value, and the rise of
the formalist, hands-off judge, in place of the judge who looks to
social welfare.57
The consequence over time was that the originality threshold
lowered, now requiring just a “modicum of creativity” instead of
human genius.58 Thus instead of assessing creativity, courts assess
authorial process and actions, such as putting pen to paper.59 Justice
combined white and yellow pages directory.”); see also Bridy, supra note 24, at 5.
52 See Bracha, supra note 47, at 186; Bridy, supra note 24, at 6.
53 See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58-59 (1884)
(holding that a high threshold of “novelty, invention, originality” was required);
Bracha, supra note 47; Bridy, supra note 24, at 2, 6.
54 Bracha, supra note 47, at 212-13 (“Revised editions, serializations of existing
works, and collected works volumes were embodiments of existing works with slight
changes. To the extent that commercial actors wanted to rely on copyright protection
in the context of such products, a substantial originality standard was out of the
question.”).
55 See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903)
(holding that advertisements for a circus are proper subjects of copyright).
56 See Bracha, supra note 47, at 218-23 (showing a move by the courts to review
“implied intent” instead).
57 Id.
58 Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 340 (1991).
59 See Boyden, supra note 23, at 380 (“[T]hat inquiry has typically been carried
out not by assessing the creativity of the material itself, but rather by considering the
actions of the putative author . . . the court merely assumes that those choices and
judgment calls — the author’s process-led to something creative in the work.”).
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Holmes famously wrote that the creativity requirement in copyright
can be met “even in handwriting, and a very modest grade of art has in
it something irreducible, which is one man’s alone.”60
The low originality threshold, which conflates the fact or process of
creation with adequate human creativity,61 allows doctrinal room for a
nonhuman author.62 Most work is original and therefore
copyrightable; courts in practice rarely engage in asking whether an
author is creative enough. Most works of algorithmic authorship will
therefore meet the low Feist standard of showing a modicum of
creativity.63 Thus originality doctrine, which is how the Constitution’s
requirement of authorship manifests in practice, does not preclude
algorithmic authorship.
Another way of understanding this doctrinal space for algorithmic
authorship is that in U.S. copyright law, judges are not supposed to
make assessments of the creative value of works.64 Ostensibly this is to
prevent the censorship of (or really, the disincentivizing of) works
that judges do not like.65 It may also be related to the arc of art history;
how is a non-art-expert judge to determine whether a Jackson Pollack
is in fact valuable art? What this means in practice is that Barnett
Newman’s zips (vertical strips of color down a color field) are as
protected by copyright law as a DaVinci painting. (Of course, in
practice judges make judgments about the creative value of works all
the time.)66 This refusal to make aesthetic judgments about a work
relates to the lack of a requirement of a human author. If judges must
forebear from analyzing whether a particular work is creative enough
and thus worth protecting, this keeps them from analyzing whether
the author is creative enough and thus worth rewarding.

60

Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 250.
See Boyden, supra note 23, at 380.
62 Bridy, supra note 24, at 10-11, 27 (“AI authorship is readily assimilable to the
current copyright framework . . . .”).
63 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 362 (“The standard of originality is low, but it does
exist.”).
64 This principle is referred to as aesthetic nondiscrimination doctrine. Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (“It would be a dangerous
undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges
of the worth of pictorial illustrations . . . .”).
65 Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 247,
248 (1998) (referring to the “possibility of censorship” and explaining that “[i]f
judges used their aesthetic tastes to make these determinations, they would
presumably influence the kinds of art created in the future”).
66 Id. at 249 (discussing aesthetic analysis in judicial opinions and concluding that
“the distinction between aesthetic reasoning and judicial reasoning is illusory”).
61
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Looking at how an AI author could fit within the U.S. copyright
regime reveals, as Annemarie Bridy has argued, just how far copyright
law is in practice from requiring humanness of its creators.67 In fact,
one form of authorship already exists, the work made for hire, that
ascribes authorship to a non-human entity, the employer-corporation.
A work made for hire is, generally speaking, a work made by an
employee for an employer where the copyright vests in the employer,
not the actual author. This concept of authorship differs greatly from
the romantic model.68 Instead of author as sole (human) genius, the
author is more like an automaton filling the dictates of her or his
employer.69 According to Bracha, the work-for-hire model abandoned
the “most fundamental tenet” of romantic authorship: “that authors
would be owners.”70 According to Bridy, it could be the model for how
to handle AI authorship.71
Work-for-hire doctrine as currently legislated technically cannot
address AI authorship, but Bridy suggests amending the Copyright
Act, as other countries have, to explicitly cover certain computercreated works.72 For Bridy, then, algorithmic authorship is not
fundamentally disruptive, or really very disruptive at all. It just
requires some tweaks to U.S. copyright law at the edges.
This brings us to the underlying question: just how disruptive is AI
authorship to U.S. copyright law? In my forthcoming longer work, I
spend more time with this question — what is legal disruption, and
how might we categorize different levels of disruptiveness. The
discussion of AI authorship provides a good example of several
possible layers of disruption: minor doctrinal, major doctrinal, and
theoretical.
Bridy believes the encounter between emergent machine authors
and U.S. copyright law is just minor doctrinal disruption, requiring
minor tweaks to copyright doctrine, not major doctrinal changes or
shifts to underlying theory. Bruce Boyden, by contrast, argues that
there is something new here — truly emergent algorithmic authorship
67

See Bridy, supra note 24, at 10-11; see also Bracha, supra note 47, at 254-55, 264.
See Bracha, supra note 47, at 259 (describing the author as a “wage laborer
carrying out a routine task assigned to him and controlled by his supervisors”).
69 Id.
70 Id. at 260.
71 See Bridy, supra note 24, at 25-27 (“The work made for hire doctrine is a more
fitting framework within which to situate the problem of AI authorship because it
represents an existing mechanism for directly vesting ownership of a copyright in a
legal person who is not the author-in-fact of the work in question.”).
72 Id. at 26-27 (discussing AI authorship work-for-hire policy suggestions and EU
examples).
68
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meaningfully disrupts copyright law. First, for Boyden, emergence
causes more significant doctrinal disruption than Bridy observes.
Boyden characterizes emergence as “a novel problem” for copyright
law because “in the fashion of most Internet law conundrums [it] fails
to fit well in existing doctrinal categories.”73 Emergent works fail to
fall clearly into the category of tool or joint author and require factual
assessment of who is (or what is) contributing what.74
Boyden also argues that emergence disrupts the theoretical rationale
behind originality doctrine, “destabilize[ing] copyright law’s approach
to authorship by obscuring the connection between the creative
process and the work.”75 Because one can no longer assume that any
variations in a work stem from a human author’s hand, emergent
algorithmic authorship threatens originality doctrine’s assumption that
almost everything is adequately creative.76 I would qualify this as a
deeper kind of disruption, one level up from tweaking the doctrine,
but not quite at the level of threatening foundational theories (such as
utilitarianism) behind the law.
In contrast to Boyden and Bridy, James Grimmelmann claims that
computer authorship is not disruptive at all. Grimmelmann explains
that algorithmic authorship will in practice be a diverse set of practices
triggering a variety of existing copyright doctrinal thickets: about
digital copies, about algorithmic generation, about contribution from
both programmers and users, and more.77 According to
Grimmelmann, “[o]ld-fashioned pen-and-paper works raise all of the
same issues; there is nothing new under the sun.”78
What I take from the existing literature is the following: the U.S.
copyright system has already moved far enough away from romantic
authorship for algorithmic authorship to be, perhaps surprisingly, not
fundamentally disruptive. And importantly, the reasons for this shift
73 Boyden, supra note 23, at 379. See also Gregory N. Mandel, History Lessons for a
General Theory of Law and Technology, 8 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 551, 552 (2007)
(explaining that with new technologies, “preexisting legal categories may no longer
apply”).
74 See id. at 385-87 (evaluating whether emergent programs are more like a wordprocessor, which is basically a tool; or like early arcade games, where even though a
user introduces variation, the amount of creativity inserted by the game developer
means it is authored by the game developer); id. at 387 (discussing cases from 1980s
federal courts); id. at 387-88 (imagining that joint authorship could be found for highuser-contribution games).
75 Id. at 380.
76 Id. at 384.
77 Grimmelmann, supra note 23, at 404.
78 Id.
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away from the romantic author — the disruption of a romantic
foundation for U.S. copyright law — have nothing to do with current
technology. Algorithmic authorship did not kill the romantic author;
other things did. As Bracha has extensively chronicled, developments
as far back as the nineteenth century threatened this romantic model.
Algorithmic authorship thus does not walk into a vacuum in
copyright law. An earlier set of technologies (or again, really, social
practices combined with technology) raised similar conversations
about authorship in copyright. As discussed in the “microworks”
literature, the internet and digital technologies enabled both lowercost collaboration across even great distances, and more easy buildingon and combining of clips of existing works.79 This threatened the
purportedly dominant romantic idea of authorship; instead of works
being the independent creation of one author whose ideas sprung out
of nowhere, they could be and often were collaborative and iterative,
with new works built on top of existing pieces. In reaction, scholars
challenged this notion of the author as sole and independent actor.
They characterized these new models of collaborative and iterative
creation as not so new after all, but an example of what authorship
really is.80 To the extent algorithmic authorship disrupts copyright law
by requiring us to reassess the romantic author, that set of issues was
already raised around far less complex digital technologies.
It is not that technology has no role in the story. Arguably the shift
away from romantic authorship was influenced by other, earlier
technologies and corresponding social practices — such as lower-cost
printing that gave rise to mass-market paperbacks that led to the
success of publishers who fought high originality thresholds. But
technology is not a disrupter in this story in a conventional sense. It
does not arrive on the scene of law that cannot handle it. It is folded
into an existing package of doctrine and underlying theory that
constructs the technology into its existing logics.
Current technology, in the words of Jack Balkin, may make salient
existing features of the law.81 In copyright law, this includes the low
originality threshold and work-made-for-hire law. It also includes the
theoretical foundations behind these legal rules: the theoretical
emphasis in the United States on utilitarianism rather than moral
79 See Justin Hughes, Size Matters (or Should) in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L.
REV. 575, 610-11 (2005); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Author Autonomy and
Atomism in Copyright Law, 96 VA. L. REV. 549, 621 (2010).
80 See Woodmansee & Jaszi, supra note 47, at 3 (showing that early printed works
in the United States involved large-scale collaboration).
81 Balkin, Digital Speech, supra note 4, at 2, 15, 32 (2004).
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rights; relatedly looking to market forces to determine the value of a
creative piece; and relatedly judicial avoidance of aesthetic
judgments.82 These are aspects of copyright law that come back into
the spotlight when the law is applied to technology that returns us to
the conversation about authorship, whether that be digital technology
that allows for the creation of microworks and collaborative works, or
algorithmic technology that allows for nonhuman (or moreattenuated-human) authorship.
Technology does not just make salient features of the law, however.
This would imply that it still acts on the system from outside the
system, as a highlighter. Technology is interpreted into the law
through existing systems of legal meaning, whether that meaning is on
the level of doctrinal detail, or theoretical foundation. Algorithmic
authorship matters to copyright law because authorship as a concept
matters to copyright law. This technology comes into the law through
that existing framing of authorship.
III. ALGORITHMIC AUTHORSHIP AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Algorithmic authorship produces different consequences in First
Amendment law, because authorship is constructed differently in First
Amendment law.83 On a textual, theoretical, and doctrinal level, the
First Amendment differs from copyright law. The meaning of
emergence — the kinds of disruption it creates, the receptivity of this
particular area of the law to it — differs as well.
The First Amendment protects speakers, including authors. But
unlike copyright law, it does not do so explicitly in its text. As written,
the First Amendment constrains Congress — “Congress shall make no
law. . . abridging the freedom of speech” — rather than protecting
particular actors.84 In recent decisions, the Supreme Court has nodded
to this so-called negative view of the First Amendment, constraining
lawmakers even when there was no showing of impact on an actual

82 Yen, supra note 65, at 248 (“[O]rthodox interpretations of copyright law leave
little, if any, room for aesthetics.”); see also Boyden, supra note 23, at 380 n.14 (“[T]he
threshold for creativity has purposefully been kept at a minimal level, following
Justice Holmes’s concern that federal judges were competent at assessing neither
popular culture nor avant-garde art.”).
83 But see Bambauer, Copyright, supra note 33, at 8 (showing a recent trend for
unifying the two); Buccafusco, supra note 33, at 1231 (describing how theories of
authorship affect the applications of copyright law).
84 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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human speaker.85 Textually, then, the First Amendment leaves even
more room for algorithmic authors than the Progress Clause does.
The dominant theories behind First Amendment protection — the
marketplace of ideas model, the democratic self-governance approach,
autonomy theory — all also leave greater room for algorithmic
authors, as noted at length by my co-authors Toni Massaro and Helen
Norton.86 In brief: First Amendment protection that is based on the
marketplace of ideas will protect algorithmic speech as long as it
brings more speech to the table for human audiences. First
Amendment protection based on democratic self-governance will
protect algorithmic speech if it contributes to the public sphere and
human audiences’ ability to participate in politics. Even First
Amendment protection premised on protecting (human) autonomy
from government intervention will protect algorithmic speech if
government intervention would harm the autonomy of human
audiences. In short, like the utilitarian theory of copyright law,
contemporary First Amendment theories contemplate the value of
algorithmic speech to human audiences and thus leave room for the
protection of AI speech in the name of humans.87
First Amendment doctrine poses different puzzles around
emergence than copyright does. Where, remember, copyright law
slotted the question of emergence into primarily two doctrinal areas —
originality doctrine and work-made-for-hire law — First Amendment
doctrine presents different questions. There is no originality or
creativity requirement in First Amendment law; speech receives
protection because it is speech, not because it is of high or low value
or creativity. Doctrinally, this is reflected in U.S. courts’ general refusal
to employ proportionality analysis — to balance the value of speech
against the degree of harm it causes.88
85 Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1418 (2016) (holding that the
government’s intent to violate the First Amendment is enough to trigger a First
Amendment violation); see Massaro et al., supra note 23, at 2493 (“[T]his negative
view understands the Free Speech Clause as ‘indifferent to a speaker’s identity or
qualities — whether animate or in-animate, corporate or nonprofit, collective or
individual.’”).
86 Massaro & Norton, supra note 17, at 1176-79; Massaro et al., supra note 23, at
2490 (“The production of ideas and information is what matters, regardless of
source.”).
87 Massaro & Norton, supra note 17, at 1193 (“We have explored here whether a
future, vastly more sophisticated Siri and her strong AI colleagues could hold
constitutional free speech rights, not just as human-operated tools, but as independent
rights bearers.”).
88 Margot Kaminski, Copyright Crime and Punishment, 73 MD. L. REV. 587, 589
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The doctrinal question faced by algorithmic (and other) expression
in First Amendment law is not one of originality. Instead, it is whether
something is speech at all, and thus covered by the First Amendment.
This is also known as the question of salience89 — is the activity at
issue even salient to (and thus covered by) the First Amendment? For
example, movies were originally not considered to be speech covered
by the First Amendment;90 this decision was later overruled as society
changed and movies became more socially accepted as expression.91
And large swatches of what is clearly speech, such as speech integral
to criminal conduct,92 are not covered by the First Amendment. This
question of salience has more recently been applied to computer
code,93 to raw data,94 and to video recording.95 Each of these
technologies has been subjected to the question of whether it is in fact
speech for First Amendment purposes.
Is algorithmic speech then speech for purposes of the First
Amendment? Or really, are emergent algorithms protected speakers? A
number of scholars have addressed this question in the context of
discussing search engines. There, because of existing First
Amendment doctrine that protects newspaper editors but provides
lesser protection for telecommunications providers,96 they face a
doctrinal categorization question. Are search engines — whose output
is authored by an algorithm — more like newspaper editors, who
receive full First Amendment coverage and protection, or more like
backbone telecommunications service providers?
(2014) (comparing “proportionality analysis that most of the world’s constitutional
courts use . . . with the Supreme Court’s tiered framework of review in First
Amendment doctrine”) [hereinafter Kaminski, Copyright Crime].
89 See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1804 (2004).
90 Mutual Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n, 236 U.S. 230, 241-43 (1915).
91 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952).
92 Eugene Volokh, The “Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct” Exception, 101
CORNELL L. REV. 981, 983-84 (2015).
93 See Robert Post, Encryption Source Code and the First Amendment, 15 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 713, 716 (2000) (analyzing if and when the First Amendment applies to
encryption source code).
94 See Jane R. Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 70-71 (2014)
(challenging the assumption that the collection of data is not speech).
95 See Alan K. Chen & Justin F. Marceau, Free Speech and Democracy in the Video
Age, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 991, 996-97 (2016) (arguing that video recording is protected
speech under the First Amendment); see also Margot E. Kaminski, Privacy and the
Right to Record, 97 B.U. L. REV. 167, 171 (2017).
96 Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974); Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 385-90 (1969).
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Eugene Volokh has claimed that search engines are protected
speakers, just like newspaper editors,97 while Tim Wu disagrees,
explaining that such purported speakers are more like passive carriers
or conduits, which receive lesser protection in First Amendment
doctrine.98 Similarly, Frank Pasquale and Oren Bracha explain that
search engines try to have it both ways, presenting themselves as
passive conduits for purposes of liability and active editors when
seeking First Amendment protection.99 According to Pasquale and
Bracha, the “prevailing character” of search engine results is “not to
express meaning but . . . to do things in the world,” making search
engines more functional than communicative and thus perhaps not
covered by the First Amendment at all.100 James Grimmelmann takes a
third approach, proposing treating search engines as advisors —
covered by the First Amendment, but less fully protected and having
significant obligations to their users.101
These categorization discussions look like the type of disruption
described by Boyden in copyright law. They are disruptions at the
level of doctrine, because the law’s existing doctrinal categories are not
well suited for the newer technology. In the case of the First
Amendment and search engines, the law developed to have two
different categories, editors and telecommunications conduits, and the
technology of search engines disrupts this by instigating discussion of
where the new technology properly falls.
The disruption is set up by the law itself, which created these
categories. In a legal system that treated editors and
telecommunications providers equally, the technology would not
trigger this discussion — or disruption — at all. And as we saw in the
discussion of copyright law, even subparts of the same legal system
will not address the same categorization questions.
AI authors will not all be search engines, however, pointing readers
to other peoples’ content. Many, like Twitter bots, will just be
straightforward speakers, creating content rather than curating or
guiding others. Consequently, most AI authors likely will not face this
precise categorization puzzle over editors and telecommunications
services. Instead, the question of whether emergent machine speech is
97 Eugene Volokh & Donald M. Falk, Google: First Amendment Protection for
Search Engine Search Results, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 883, 885 (2012).
98 Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1521-22 (2013).
99 Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission — Access, Fairness,
and Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1193 (2008).
100 Id.
101 James Grimmelmann, Speech Engines, 98 MINN. L. REV. 868, 893 (2014).
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salient to the First Amendment occurs at two possible levels: a social/
cultural one, and a fine doctrinal one. On the social or cultural level,
the question of whether AI speech is covered by the First Amendment
is a broader question of whether humans accept AI speakers as
speakers.102 On the doctrinal level, emergent algorithmic authorship
could disrupt a particular doctrinal test within the First Amendment.
In a subset of cases, the question of whether something is speech for
purposes of the First Amendment manifests as a question of whether
some act constitutes speech or conduct.103 In Spence v. Washington, the
Supreme Court asked whether taping a peace symbol to an upsidedown flag constituted speech.104 The Court explained that because the
action constituted “an intent to convey a particularized message,” and
“in the surrounding circumstances . . . the message would be
understood by those who viewed it,” it was covered by the First
Amendment.105 This Spence test, requiring an intent to convey a
particularized message that is likely to be understood, was used by the
Court in later cases evaluating the protection of parades, and of flag
burning.106 Stuart Benjamin suggests applying a variant of the Spence
test to algorithmic speech, asking whether there is “a [substantive]
message that is sendable and receivable and that one actually chooses
to send.”107
At the doctrinal fine edges, emergent algorithmic authorship could
disrupt this question. The Spence test asks whether a speaker intends to
communicate a message that is likely to be understood.108 Can an AI
speaker have adequate intent to communicate a message, for purposes
of this test?109 A court could choose to reject emergent speech if it

102 Andrew Tutt, Software Speech, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 73, 77 (2012)
(“Software, in other words, should be considered not for what it is or even what it says
but for what it means to society to treat it like speech.”).
103 See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 370-72 (1968) (analyzing whether
destruction of draft cards was speech or conduct).
104 Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 405 (1974).
105 Id. at 410-11.
106 Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 569
(1995); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 402-03 (1989).
107 Benjamin, supra note 33, at 1461.
108 Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11 (1974).
109 Benjamin, supra note 32, at 1481 (“At that point, we might say that the
connection to the human creators is sufficiently attenuated . . . . Extending the First
Amendment to messages produced by this artificial intelligence would raise the
specter . . . [of] treating the products of machines like those of human minds.”).
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decides that AI cannot have intent, or does not adequately express the
intent of its human programmer.110
But this mischaracterizes how the Spence test has historically been
used. Spence does not line draw between, say, one novel and another
— it line draws between a novel and flag burning.111 To say that an
article or novel written by an algorithm does not constitute speech is
to misunderstand the work the doctrine currently does in
distinguishing physically situated speech from more abstract speech
on the page. An article written by an algorithm is as “speechy” as an
article written by a human, from the perspective of a human reader.
Returning to my work with Massaro and Norton: if what we care
about is the perspective of human readers, or listeners, or informed
citizens, it should not matter whether the algorithm had an intent to
produce the work or not.112 What should matter is whether the work
reads as speech to those who encounter it. A government that censors
a political novel written by an algorithm is as problematic from the
perspective of a reader as a government that censors a political novel
written by Tolstoy.
IV. COMPARING COPYRIGHT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Emergent machine authorship will thus trigger and interface with
different doctrinal and theoretical questions in copyright and First
Amendment law — differently disrupting the law, with the same
technology. Where copyright asks (or really does not ask) whether a
work is minimally creative enough, the First Amendment asks
whether a work is speech or action. Where copyright doctrine
contemplates whether a machine can be a co-author or a tool, First
Amendment doctrine asks whether it is an editor or a communications
conduit. Where copyright theory asks if the law provides adequate
incentives for the production of beneficial creative work, First
Amendment theory asks whether protecting a work informs citizens,

110 Intent also plays a role in the historic First Amendment exceptions, which I
discuss elsewhere with co-authors but refrain from delving into here. Massaro et al.,
supra note 23, at 2507 (discussing the doctrinal standard for defamation).
111 Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory,
Discourse, and the Right to Record, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 373 (2011) (describing how
the Supreme Court now accepts that images are covered as speech, without inquiring
whether they convey a particularized message likely to be understood).
112 Massaro et al., supra note 23, at 2487 (explaining that “[c]onferring . . . AI
speakers with First Amendment rights is consistent with free speech theories that
focus . . . on expression’s usefulness to human listeners”).
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increases the amount of speech in the marketplace, or protects reader
and listener autonomy.
The relationship between copyright and First Amendment law is
complicated, to say the least.113 Copyright is the “engine of free
expression,” incentivizing the production of more speech at the same
time that it clearly creates hurdles to downstream speech.114 Thus
ascribing copyright protection — ascribing ownership in speech —
does not and will not perfectly overlap with ascribing First
Amendment protection — protecting freedom of expression.115 A
comparison of underlying theories helps explain why.
The underlying theories behind copyright and First Amendment
law— and consequently, the doctrinal treatment of authors and their
output — are not one-to-one matches.116 For example, free speech law
protects short utterances such as “Fuck the Draft,” under a hybrid
marketplace-of-ideas and democratic self-governance rationale and
certainly under autonomy theory.117 Under autonomy theory, telling
someone not to utter this phrase impinges on her autonomy without
mitigating an adequately significant harm. Under the marketplace of
ideas theory, “Fuck the Draft” is protected because it contributes to
the pool of ideas from which listeners draw; under democratic selfgovernance theory, it is protected because it is a political utterance.
But while “Fuck the Draft” is protected as free expression, it is likely
not afforded copyright protection,118 because both utilitarianism and
113 See Kaminski, Copyright Crime, supra note 88, at 599-600 n.90 (identifying
criticisms of the U.S. approach to copyright law and free speech).
114 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
115 But see Bambauer, Copyright, supra note 33, at 3 (“[W]here one finds a work
with sufficient authorship to obtain copyright protection, one should nearly always
conclude that the work merits protection against regulation based on freedom of
speech.”); Buccafusco, supra note 33, at 1231.
116 The theories behind First Amendment protection do overlap in places with the
dominant theories behind copyright protection. For example, the marketplace of ideas
rationale, which theorizes that we protect speech so as to increase the amount of ideas
in the marketplace, could be characterized as a type of utilitarianism, protecting
individual authors’ speech so that there is a larger pool of high value speech available
for audiences.
117 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (“The constitutional right of free
expression is powerful medicine in a society as diverse and populous as ours. It is
designed and intended to remove governmental restraints from the arena of public
discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands
of each of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately produce a more
capable citizenry and more perfect polity and in the belief that no other approach
would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our
political system rests.”).
118 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 35, at § 313.4(C) (stating the Copyright
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natural rights theory dictate that short phrases, or the building blocks
of future communication, should not be owned by individuals.119
Utilitarianism suggests that copyrighting a short phrase would put up
barriers to future speech by creating the kinds of licensing thickets or
anti-commons decried by most copyright scholars.120 This would
decrease net social welfare. And natural rights theory dictates that
when authors write short phrases such as this, they may not have put
enough labor in to deserve ownership of the outcome.
Thus if an algorithmic author writes “Fuck the Draft,” then the
answer to the questions “is this speech protected under the First
Amendment” and “does this speech receive copyright protection” will
be different. This is not because the author is an algorithm, but
because the theories behind the areas of law dictate different answers
regardless of whether the author is human or an AI.
That is, different subparts of the legal system may produce different
results for the same speech by the same technology — not because of
some inherent feature of the technology, but because these subparts
serve different theoretical purposes. The same feature (emergence) of
the same technology (algorithmic authors) will be received differently
in these two areas of the law.
As the doctrine develops — as judges and scholars confront
doctrinal categorization questions and call on theory to help answer
them — there may be further divergence between the two areas of law.
It may make sense under, say, a democratic self-governance theory to
afford First Amendment protection to an algorithmically authored oped, treating the AI more like an editor or speaker than a
communicative tool, at the same time that it may make sense from a
utilitarian perspective not to ascribe joint authorship to the machine
because an AI cannot be incentivized, or human authors are already
adequately incentivized.
Despite theoretical differences, there are some fundamental
similarities between these two areas of law as currently developed. It
just so happens that the doctrinal hurdles for authorship in both
copyright and First Amendment law are low enough that algorithmic
authorship could plausibly pass both. One could imagine
counterfactuals where this were not the case. For example, say
copyright’s originality requirement was higher, and required real
human ingenuity of its authors, rather than just a “modicum of
Office’s policy of not registering words or short phrases as copyrightable “because they
contain a de minimis amount of authorship”).
119 See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 79, at 580; Van Houweling, supra note 79, at 621.
120 Hughes, supra note 79, at 608.
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creativity.” Then judges would be faced with evaluating, doctrinally,
whether a machine were capable of human ingenuity — whether an AI
were creative enough to count as an author, and whether such
creativity would ever bestow authorship on something non-human.
Or one could imagine a First Amendment that, as free expression
law does in other countries, balanced the value of particular speech
against the harm it causes.121 That version of the First Amendment
might, again, look to the value of the speech at issue, including
evaluating its creativity or artistic and social merit. But under current
theory and doctrine, we have copyright law and First Amendment law
that make — perhaps surprising — room for AI authorship.
This suggests that the stories behind the development of a
conception of authorship in copyright and First Amendment law
might be similar. In copyright law, as discussed above, a confluence of
interested actors, a change in judicial philosophy, and a shift towards
appreciating the market value of creative goods over intrinsic value all
pushed away from romantic authorship.122 In First Amendment law,
the story is fairly similar. Courts have shifted First Amendment
doctrine away from proportionality (balancing rights) to a categorical
approach (all speech is salient, with slim exceptions such as
obscenity), at least in part as a reaction to historic decisions
underprotecting political speech in the 1950s.123 This can also be
understood as the shift towards formalistic judging instead of judging
weighted with social values. In fact, current judicial refusals to weigh
the value of speech in First Amendment law echo the aesthetic
nondiscrimination doctrine in copyright law (and vice versa),
reflecting a fear of individual judicial bias and favoring purportedly
neutral formal analysis.
In First Amendment doctrine, as in copyright doctrine, powerful
actors have realized the power of the doctrine and its relationship to
their interests at stake. Where cases used to be litigated predominantly
by news organizations, recent First Amendment cases have been
121 See, e.g., Alexander Tsesis, Free Speech Constitutionalism, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV.
1015, 1029, 1064 (2015) (describing how hate speech is often prohibited in other
countries after weighing the harms and value of such speech).
122 Bracha, supra note 47, at 201.
123 See Margot E. Kaminski, The First Amendment’s Public Relations Problem: A
Response to Alexander Tsesis’s Free Speech Constitutionalism, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. SLIP
OPINIONS 103, 108 (“Courts’ aversion to balancing in the First Amendment context
also stems from important historical examples. Use of the ‘clear-and-present-danger
test’ in the 1950s gave First Amendment balancing a bad name, as the Court
condemned minority propagandists who turned out, with some historical distance, to
have been potential drivers of important social change.”).
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brought by commercial actors seeking deregulation.124 I do not intend
here to take a side in the conversation about the validity of these
claims, just to note the parallels between the development of copyright
law and First Amendment law, with commercial and non-individual
actors using doctrinal footholds to push for the extension of a rights
regime to cover non-individual authorship or speech.125
Algorithmic authorship thus encounters two existing scenes of
regulation that have room for non-human authors. This is not because
emergent machine authorship impacted the law; it is because the law
developed in a way that makes a particular meaning of emergence.
Copyright and First Amendment law as currently developed and
theorized construct emergence in a relatively non-disruptive way. The
disruption may come, instead, as courts balk at giving ownership or
authorship to an actual non-human, requiring a reconfiguration of,
say, originality doctrine, or a move up to questioning just how
utilitarian U.S. copyright law is.
CONCLUSION
The impact of AI (emergence) on two areas of law that address
authorship — copyright and First Amendment law — is determined in
large part by those areas of law themselves. Emergent machine
authorship does not disrupt the law because emergence, or
algorithmic “intelligence,” is some sort of inherently and particularly
disruptive quality of new technology. It encounters existing legal
doctrine and theory, and is more or less disruptive based on how that
doctrine and theory has developed.
In U.S. copyright and First Amendment law, emergence or AI
disrupts the concept of authorship less than one might expect, because
in both areas of law, romantic authorship has already been disrupted
by other forces. It may be surprising, in both copyright and First
Amendment law, that authorship does not center around
humanness.126 While algorithmic authorship may make that quality
124 See, e.g., Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133, 133 (2015)
(“[T]he First Amendment possesses near total deregulatory potential . . . . [and]
operates as the fullest boundary line of constitutional state action.”). But see Jane. R.
Bambauer & Derek E. Bambauer, Information Libertarianism, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 335,
360-61 (2017) (advocating direct regulation of conduct rather than indirect regulation
of speech and information).
125 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 371-72 (2010) (“The
First Amendment protects political speech; and disclosure permits citizens and
shareholders to react to the speech of corporate entities in a proper way.”).
126 Massaro et al., supra note 23, at 2482 (“First Amendment law increasingly
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visible — or salient — it did not cause or create that feature of the law.
It has been interpreted into it.
Examining emergent machine authors and their interface with U.S.
law illustrates several ways in which technology can be legally
disruptive. Technology can require minor doctrinal tweaks, as in the
case of work-for-hire doctrine and AI authorship. Or it can fall
between existing legal categories, as in the case of assessing whether
search engines are editors or conduits. Or technology can trigger a
reassessment of underlying theories behind the law, whether lower
level theorization of what it means to be an author in copyright, or
higher level theorization of why we protect speech in a democracy.
Technology is clearly not the only element interpreted into a system
of legal meaning that triggers such legal moments. Social change can
similarly break down existing legal categories, and require theoretical
reassessments. (One can, in fact, characterize technological changes as
a type of social change.127) Even new fact patterns can lead to these
kinds of assessments. Thus a bigger question is: what, if anything, is
unique about technological disruption of the law?
One answer is that technology as a type of change may merely speed
up the legal processes that naturally occur anyway. Technological
disruption is often characterized as being a “pacing problem,” in
which law cannot keep up with technological expertise and change.128
In conversations about technology and legal disruption, we often
presume a confluence between newness and unregulability.
Emergent authorship is not, in either copyright or First Amendment
law, disruptive in the sense that the law cannot function around it or
keep up with new technological developments. Emergence is not
unregulable, at least not in these legal contexts. It may shift the
conversation in both copyright and First Amendment law from
applying existing doctrine up to the level of theory, to determine
whether the current state of the doctrine is doing what we want it to
do. But emergence does not escape the law; it encounters, is
interpreted through, and is shaped by it.

focuses not on protecting speakers as speakers but instead on providing value to
listeners and constraining the government.”).
127 Lyria B. Moses, Why Have a Theory of Law and Technological Change?, 8 MINN.
J.L. SCI. & TECH. 589, 598 (2007) (“Technological change is one type of social
change.”).
128 Id. at 600 (“While technological change is not as sudden as might be
imagined . . . it is usually speedier than social change and thus prompts more urgent
calls for the law to ‘catch up.’”).
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Thus legal disruption — the disruption of law by technology — is
not always a story of technological exceptionalism or technological
determinism. Legal analysis is not a matter of determining what it is
about a particular technology that will act upon the law to challenge
it, or change it, or destroy it. Legal disruption is largely a conversation
about what a technology encounters. The law matters as much to this
conversation as the technology does.

